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Abstract
This study examines how redistributive policy attempting to reduce in-
equality by taxing the bequests of the rich and redistributing the revenue
to the poor affects economic growth in an overlapping generations model
of R&D-based growth with both product development and process inno-
vation. We show that such a policy simultaneously increases growth and
reduces inequality in the long run. When the market structure adjusts, par-
tially reducing inequality in the short run, the effect of redistributive policy
on economic growth depends on the values of the social return to variety
parameter. However, when the market structure adjusts fully in the long run,
the redistributive policy decreases the entry of new firms but raises economic
growth and reduces inequality. These favorable predictions of redistributive
bequest taxation on growth and inequality are partly consistent with the em-
pirical findings that redistribution is generally benign in terms of economic
growth and that lower post-transfer inequality is correlated with faster and
more durable growth.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the links between rising in-
equality and economic growth. While the empirical literature seems to have con-
verged toward a tentative consensus that inequality is generally harmful to growth,
at least over the medium-term (e.g., Persson and Tabellini 1994; Easterly 2007;
Hatler et al.2014; Berg et al. 2018), the policy implications are far from clear.
The traditional argument that redistribution in the form of higher taxes and sub-
sidies reduces incentives to work and invest has been emphasized in Alesina and
Rodrick’s (1994) and Persson and Taballini’s (1994) models. Even if inequality
is bad for growth, considering such a tradeoff between redistribution and growth,
taxes and transfer may be worse for growth than the inequality itself.
However, several authors have recognized that redistribution need not be in-
herently bad for growth. For example, in the presence of imperfect credit and
insurance markets, redistribution can be growth-enhancing through an “oppor-
tunity creation effect” that allows more individuals to invest in education, as in
Galor and Zeira (1993), or through an “insurance effect” that provides a certain
degree of insurance to entrepreneurs and stimulates research and growth, as in
Garcı́a-Peñelosa and Wen (2008). Moreover, the progressive taxation that is used
to finance public education and public health expenditures may increase the return
on the private educational investments of the poor, increase the average level of
education in an economy, and promote growth (e.g., Saint Paul and Verdier, 1993,
1997; Benabou 2000).
The evidence of the relationship between redistribution and growth is not
clear-cut. Studies that look at presumptive indicators of redistribution, such as
taxes or government spending, tend to suggest that more redistribution is detri-
mental to growth. However, surprisingly little evidence shows that increases in
tax rates impede medium to long-run economic growth (e.g., Tanzi and Zee 1997;
Jaimovich and Rebelo 2012). With respect to spending, many papers find that
some categories of public spending that are retributive (e.g., public spending on
health, education, and infrastructure) have no apparent adverse impact on growth
or are positively related to growth (e.g., Benabou 2000; Bleaney et al. 2001; Lin-
dert 2004).
Using a recently complied data set that clearly distinguishes between market
(pre-tax and transfer) and net (post-tax and transfer) inequality, Ostry et al. (2014)
and Berg et al. (2018) examine the role of both redistribution and inequality in
growth using a common empirical framework. Across various estimation meth-
ods, data samples, and robustness checks, they find that redistribution is generally
benign in terms of economic growth, and the lower post-tax and transfer inequal-
ity is correlated with faster and more durable growth. Their results indicate that
fiscal redistribution, unless it is extreme, may be both pro-growth and pro-equality
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via equity-inducing effects.
Motivated by these recent developments in theoretical analyses and empirical
findings, we examine, in a theoretical model, how redistributive policy that at-
tempts to reduce inequality by taxing the bequests of the rich and redistributing
the revenue to the poor affects economic growth in an overlapping generations
model of R&D-based growth with both product development and process innova-
tion. Technological progress via R&D innovation has been identified as the pri-
mary driving force of modern economic growth (e.g., Romer 1990). However, to
the best of my knowledge, only a few existing studies examine the effect of redis-
tributive policy on economic growth in an R&D-based growth framework. In line
with the literature of the second-generation R&D-based growth model pioneered
by Peretto (1998), Segestrom (1998), and Howitt (1999), the model developed
in this paper features two dimensions of technological progress. In the vertical
dimension, incumbent production firms invest in process innovation to improve
the quality of their product. In the horizontal dimension, the product development
sector creates new product designs for firms entering the production sector.
In this Schumpeterian growth model with an endogenous market structure
(EMS) measured by the equilibrium number of firms, we examine the effect of
the redistributive policy on growth and inequality. Then, we show that such a re-
distributive policy simultaneously raises growth and reduces inequality in the long
run. When the market structure adjusts partially in the short run, the effect of re-
distributive policy on economic growth depends on the values of the social return
to variety parameter, while it reduces inequality. However, when the market struc-
ture adjusts fully in the long run, the redistributive policy decreases the number
of firms but raises economic growth and reduces inequality. Thus, redistributive
bequest taxation is perhaps appropriate for stimulating long-run economic growth
and reducing inequality. By employing the second-generation R&D-based growth
model, this paper sheds light on the new mechanism that the redistributive policy
simultaneously raises growth and reduces inequality.
The intuition behind our theoretical results is explained as follows. The re-
distributive bequest taxation increases the income of the poor but decreases the
income of the rich, which lowers inequality. Since the rich save a larger propor-
tion of their income than the poor do, such a redistributive policy decreases the
economy’s aggregate savings, decreasing the demand for a share of each produc-
tion firm. These factors decrease the market value of blueprints of a new variety
and the equilibrium entry of new firms, negatively affecting the per capita output
growth rate in the short run. In the long run, however, the decline in the entry of
new firms increases the market size of each production firm. Given that the mar-
ket size of a production firm determines its incentives for process innovation, the
3
higher redistributive bequest tax rate increases long-run economic growth.1 These
favorable predictions for redistributive bequest taxation on growth and inequality
are partly consistent with the empirical findings that redistribution is generally be-
nign in terms of economic growth and that lower post-tax and transfer inequality
is correlated with faster and more durable growth.
The counterintuitive long-run positive effect of redistributive bequest taxation
on economic growth is based on the feature of the second-generation R&D-based
growth model. In the conventional second-generation R&D-based growth model,
the research productivity of variety R&D is specified to preclude the counter-
factual scale effect prediction of economic growth. This specification links the
steady-state number of firms to the market size (i.e., the labor size) of the econ-
omy in an intuitive manner, making it so only the vertical dimension of technolog-
ical progress (i.e., process innovation) works as a plausible engine of economic
growth in the long run. 2 This feature plays a key role in deriving our counterin-
tuitive positive effect of redistributive bequest taxation on economic growth.
This paper is closely related to the following two branches of the literature.
First, this paper is related to a few pioneering theoretical studies that analyze the
effects of redistributive policy on growth and inequality in an R&D-based growth
model (e.g., Chou and Talmain., 1996; Caucutt et al. 2003, 2006; Garcı́a-Peñelosa
and Wen, 2008). Chou and Talmain (1996) incorporate heterogeneous households
with different initial assets into the variety expanding growth model and show that
when the labor Engel curve is concave, the more equal wealth distribution raises
the aggregate labor supply and the growth rate. Caucutt et al. (2003, 2006) de-
velop a numerical simulation model of endogenous technical change where the
stock of skilled labor matters for growth and shows that an increase in tax progres-
sivity may increase the long-run skill premium, decrease the upward mobility of
the poor, and decrease the human capital investment of both skilled and unskilled
individuals. Garcı́a-Peñelosa and Wen (2008) examine the effects of redistribu-
tive taxation on growth and inequality in a Schumpeterian model with risk-averse
agents and show that redistribution provides insurance to entrepreneurs and in-
creases the growth rate. In contrast to these studies, we employ a Schumpeterian
growth model with EMS (i.e., the second-generation R&D-based growth model).
These differences in the modeling strategy of technical change enable us to reveal
1Laincz and Peretto (2006) provide empirical evidence for a positive relationship between the
average firm size and economic growth.
2The advantage of the second-generation R&D-based growth model is that we can eliminate
the well-known undesirable scale effect (e.g., Jones 1995) while keeping the policy effect prop-
erty supported by the recent growing empirical literature (e.g., Laincz and Peretto, 2006; Ha and
Howitt, 2007; Madsen, 2008; Madsen et al., 2010; Ang and Madsen, 2011). The model is also
consistent with empirical evidence concerning industrial organization (e.g., Adames and Jaffe,
1996; Pagano and Schivardi, 2003).
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different aspects of the relationship between the redistributive policy and eco-
nomic growth that have yet to be examined in the literature. In this sense, our
research complements these existing theoretical analyses.
Second, this paper is related to recent studies of a Schumpeterian growth
model with EMS. For example, using the Schumpeterian growth model with EMS,
Chu et al. (2016) explore the effect of patent breadth and R&D policy, Chu and
Ji (2016) explore the effect of unionization, Ji et al. (2016) explore the effect of
monetary policy, and Morimoto and Tabata (2020) explore the effect of higher
education subsidy policy. However, to the best of my knowledge, the relationship
between redistributive policy and economic growth has yet to be examined rigor-
ously in the literature. Therefore, our research complements these existing studies
and tackles an issue that has gone unexplored in the literature.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. Sec-
tion 3 investigates the dynamic and the steady-state equilibrium properties of the
economy. Section 4 employs a numerical analysis to examine the effects of redis-
tributive bequest taxation on economic growth, inequality, and welfare. Finally,
section 5 briefly discusses the limitations of our analysis and concludes the paper.
2 Model
This section introduces a two-period OLG model of R&D-based growth with re-
distributive policy, endogenous productivity growth, and variety expansion. The
economy consists of three sectors (i.e., a final goods sector, an intermediate goods
sector, and a product development sector). The final goods sector produces ho-
mogeneous goods for sales in a perfectly competitive market, with both a vari-
ety of imperfectly substitutable intermediate goods and labor as inputs. On the
other hand, the intermediate goods sector consists of monopolistically competi-
tive firms that produce differentiated product varieties for firms in the final goods
sector. Productivity growth arises as a result of process innovation undertaken
by the intermediate-goods firms to improve the quality of their product. Finally,
the product development sector creates new product designs for firms entering the
intermediate goods sector.
2.1 Individuals
Individuals in this economy live for two periods, young and old, and the cohort
born in period t is called generation t.3 In each period, the size of newly born co-
horts is given by L. There are two groups of families, “rich” and “poor,” denoted
3Some basic settings in our household side of the model are inherited from Bossmann et al.
(2007) and Maebayashi and Konishi (2021).
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by R and P, respectively. We assume that a constant fraction ϕ ∈ (0, 1) of individ-
uals are the rich and a constant fraction 1 − ϕ ∈ (0, 1) of individuals are the poor.
Each individual supplies one unit of labor inelastically and earns labor income in
their young period. In the old period, they are retired and consume their savings
and leave bequests to their children.
The lifetime utility of individual i ∈ {R, P} born in period t is expressed as
follows:
U it = (1 − αi) ln ci1,t + αi
[
(1 − β) ln ci2,t+1 + β ln bit+1
]
, (1)
where ci1,t and c
i
2,t+1 represent their consumption during their youth and old age,
respectively, and bit+1 represents the bequest passed onto the child, reflecting a
joy of giving motives for savings. αi ∈ (0, 1) is the intertemporal preference
parameter and β ∈ (0, 1) is the relative importance parameter of consumption
when old and the bequest is made. We assume that β does not differ between
the rich and poor following Bossmann et al. (2007) and Maebayashi and Konishi
(2021). In addition, we assume that αR > αP based on Becker (1980) and several
empirical evidences (e.g., Lawrance, 1991; Harrison et al., 2002). Under this
assumption, the rich save a larger proportion of their income than the poor do,
which is also supported by recent empirical studies (e.g., Dynan et al, 2004; Bozio
et al, 2013; Alan et al, 2014; Néstor, 2017). Moreover, we assume that the wealth
endowment of the rich old generation in the initial period is larger than that of the
poor old generations (i.e., sR−1 > s
P
−1). The budget constraints of these individuals
are expressed as follows:
ci1,t + s
i
t = wt + b
i
t + Tt, (2)
ci2,t+1 + (1 + τ) b
i
t+1 = (1 + rt+1)s
i
t, (3)
where wt is wage rate, rt+1 is interest rate, τ ∈ (0, 1) is the tax on the bequests, and
Tt is the uniform lump-sum transfer received from the government. By maximiz-





















Equation (6) indicates that the savings of the current generation sit are linked to
the savings of their parents sit−1 because the bequests from their parents depend on
their wealth income from (5). Therefore, assumption αR > αP shows that the rich
save more than the poor do and leave more wealth to their offspring. This means
that the rich tend to accumulate more wealth than the poor do.
6
2.2 Final Good
Following Aghion and Howitt (2005) and Peretto (2011, 2015), we assume that














where {θ, γ, η} ∈ (0, 1). Xt( j) is the quantity of intermediate good j ∈ [0,Nt], Nt
is the mass of available intermediate goods in period t and Lt is the service of la-
bor purchased from the household. In equilibrium, the relationship Lt = L holds.
The productivity of intermediate good Xt( j) depends on its own quality Zt( j) and
on the average quality Zt ≡ 1Nt (
∫ Nt
0
Zt( j)d j) of all intermediate goods capturing
technology spillovers. The quality is the good’s ability to raise the productivity of
Lt. The private return to quality is determined by γ, and the degree of technology
spillovers is determined by 1 − γ. The parameter η captures the degree of con-
gestion of the services of labor across intermediate goods. For η = 0, there is no
congestion, meaning that services of labor can be shared by all intermediate goods
with no loss of productivity. This is a case of extreme economies of scope in the
use of labor services. The reduced-form representations of the production func-
tion in equilibrium (shown later) manifest themselves as strong social increasing
returns to product variety. In contrast, η = 1 yields full congestion, where there
are no economies of scope and therefore no social returns to variety.
Profit maximization yields the following optimal conditions:














where Pt( j) is the price of intermediate good j. Competitive producers of final
goods pay θYt =
∫ Nt
0
Pt( j)Xt( j)d j for intermediate goods and (1 − θ)Yt = wtL for
labor.
2.3 Intermediate goods and in-house R&D
Monopolistic firms produce differentiated intermediate goods with a linear tech-
nology that requires one unit of final good to produce one unit of intermediate
good j ∈ [0,Nt]. In addition, to improve the quality of its product, the firm in
industry j also devotes ZtIt( j) units of final good to R&D. In line with Aghion and
Howitt (2005), the number of final inputs required to improve the product quality
increases proportionally with the average quality of products Zt.
7
Based on Grossmann (2007, 2009), the firm can increase product quality ac-
cording to the technology
Zt( j) = kZt−1It( j), (10)
where k is the efficiency parameter of in-house R&D and It( j) is R&D in effective
units of the final output. The productivity of in-house R&D, It( j), is given by
the exogenous parameter k times the average quality of product in period t − 1,
Zt−1. We adopt the level of the average quality of the product in period t − 1
as a proxy for the stock of public technological knowledge in period t, which
accumulates within firms as a byproduct of process innovation. Following the
process innovation framework employed by Peretto (2011, 2015) and others, we
model knowledge spillovers into process innovations among firms as a function
of the average quality of products observable by the R&D departments of firms.
In industry j, the monopolistic firm’s net profit in period t is
πt( j) =
[
Pt( j) − 1
]
Xt( j) − ZtIt( j). (11)
The monopolistic firm in industry j maximize (11) subject to (8) and (10). Profit









Using equations (11) to (13) and θYt = NtPtXt, we obtain the following maximum
net profits for each intermediate firm in period t:




Because of the ex-ante homogeneity of the individuals, all intermediate goods
firms behave in the same way. Thus, we omit index j whenever this does not lead
to confusion.
2.4 Product Development Sector
Between periods t and t + 1, competitive R&D firms in the product development
sector devote INt units of final outputs, develop Nt+1 − Nt new blueprints, and sell
these blueprints to intermediate goods firms at their market values of Vt. Thus,
given a research productivity of 1/δt, output is expressed as follows:
Nt+1 − Nt = (1/δt)INt , (15)
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Following Peretto (2011), research productivity 1/δt is a given for each firm but
depends on the aggregate level, negatively on the average quality of product, as
follows:
δt = δZt, (16)
where δ is the inefficiency parameter of product variety R&D. This specification
implies that the cost of the creation of a newly designed product adds to the exist-
ing stock of product design and increases proportionally with the average quality
of product Zt.
Under the assumption of free entry in the product development sector, the
expected gain of (Vt/δt)INt from R&D must not exceed the cost of I
N
t for a finite
size of R&D activities at equilibrium. Thus, we have the following condition:
Vt = δt = δZt. (17)
We next consider no-arbitrage conditions. The market value of intermediate
goods firms Vt (i.e., the market value of blueprints) is related to the risk-free gross
interest rate 1 + rt+1. Shareholders of intermediate goods firms that purchased
these shares during period t obtain dividends of πt+1 during period t + 1 and can
sell these shares to the subsequent generation at a value of Vt+1. In the financial
market, the total returns from holding the stock of a particular intermediate firm
must be equal to the returns on the risk-free asset (1 + rt+1)Vt, which implies the
following no-arbitrage condition:





The only tax instrument of the government is the tax on bequests. Following
Bossman et al. (2007), the government taxes the bequests of all old individuals
at rate τ and redistributes its revenue among the all young individuals in a lump
sum. Every young individual receives the same transfer Tt that corresponds to the
average tax revenue per tax case,
Tt = τ
[
ϕbRt + (1 − ϕ) bPt
]
. (19)
Since the rich leave more wealth than the poor, these policies indicate a net trans-
fer of income from the rich to the poor.
2.6 Market-clearing conditions













(1 − ϕ)L + δt (Nt+1 − Nt) + Nt (Xt + ZtIt) . (20)
9
In addition, as shown in Appendix A, we can obtain the following asset market
equilibrium condition:
VtNt+1 = At ≡ sRt ϕL + sPt (1 − ϕ)L (21)
where At expresses the total assets (savings) held by young agents in period t. This
condition states that the total savings of young individuals in period t must be used
for investing in new inventions (Vt(Nt+1 − Nt)) or purchasing existing stocks that
were owned by preceding generations (VtNt).
2.7 Aggregation





where σ ≡ 1−η. Thus the reduced-form representation of the production function
of the economy features a social return to variety equal to σ and a social return to
















which is determined by quality growth rate GZt ≡ Zt+1Zt and the variety growth rate
GNt ≡ Nt+1Nt . The degree of social return to variety parameter σ determines the
relative importance of variety expansion on per capita output growth.





= k(1 − θ)θ 1+θ1−θγ L
N1−σt+1
≡ GZ (Nt+1) , (24)
where GZN (Nt+1) < 0. As depicted in Figure 1, the quality growth rate G
Z
t in period
t is negatively related to the number of intermediate-good firms Nt+1 in period t+1.
As the number of firms Nt+1 increases, each firm’s market size decreases, which
motivates firms to invest less in process innovation and thereby lowers the product
quality growth rate GZt .
3 Dynamics of inequality and product variety
In this section, we derive the global transition dynamics of the economy and in-
vestigate how the expansion of variety and inequality relate to each other.
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3.1 Dynamic system
In this subsection, we derive the dynamic system of the market equilibrium based
on the model in the preceding section. By substituting (5), (6), (9), (14), (17),
(18), and (19) into At = sRt ϕL + s
P
t (1 − ϕ)L, we obtain
At = ᾱ(1−θ)Yt+β
[











where ᾱ ≡ αRϕ + αp(1 − ϕ).



























holds from the definition of φt and
At. As stressed by Maebayashi and Konishi (2021), since φt represents the ratio
of total savings of the rich to aggregate savings, φt serves as a convenient measure
of inequality. If φt is close to the population ratio of the rich, ϕ, the economy
expresses weak inequality (i.e., equality). Conversely, if φt is close to 0 or 1, the
economy expresses strong inequality. In the following analyses, we assume that
φ−1 > ϕ. It means that the wealth endowment of the rich old generation in the
initial period is larger than that of the poor old generations (i.e., sR−1 > s
P
−1). Under
this initial condition and the assumption αR > αP, in equilibrium, the relationship
φt > ϕ holds for all period t. The rich tend to accumulate more wealth than the
poor do for all period t.
Substituting (17), (22), and VtNt+1 = At into (26) and rearranging it, we can
express the dynamics of variety Nt as follows:
Nt+1 = ΓR (Nt, φt−1; τ) + ΓP (Nt, φt−1; τ) ≡ µ (Nt, φt−1; τ) , (27)
where ΓR (Nt, φt−1; τ) ≡ αR
{
ϕ f (Nt) + β
[




, ΓP (Nt, φt−1; τ) ≡
αP
{
(1 − ϕ) f (Nt) + β
[




and f (Nt) ≡ 1−θδ θ
2θ
(1−θ) LNσt .
From (27), µ (Nt, φt−1; τ) satisfies (a) µN (Nt, φt−1; τ) > 0, (b) µφ (Nt, φt−1; τ) > 0,
and (c) µτ (Nt, φt−1; τ) < 0 for φt−1 > ϕ and µτ (Nt, φt−1; τ) > 0 for φt−1 < ϕ. See
Appendix B for details. The property (a) indicates that an increase in the number
of specialized intermediate goods Nt increases the wage rate, which positively af-
fects the aggregate savings of the economy, and thereby increases the demand for
shares of each intermediate-goods firm. These factors increase the market value
of blueprints of a new variety, which positively affects the equilibrium number
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of product varieties. The property (b) indicates that the greater inequality φt−1
positively affects the aggregate savings of the economy, and thereby increases the
equilibrium number of product varieties. Since αR > αP, the rich save more than
the poor do and leave more wealth to their offspring. Therefore, the inequality
φt−1 driven by the rich contributes to the growth in aggregate savings as well as
the equilibrium number of product varieties. The property (c) indicates that in the
region where the relationship φt−1 > ϕ holds, the redistributive policy negatively
affects the aggregate savings of the economy, and thereby decreases the equilib-
rium number of product varieties. The redistributive policy increases the income
of poor, whereas it decreases the income of rich. Since the rich save a larger pro-
portion of income than the poor, the redistributive policy decreases the aggregate
savings of the economy and the equilibrium number of product varieties.
Moreover, using (5), (6), (9), (14), (17), (18), (19), (21), (22), (27) and the
definition of φt, we can express the dynamics of the share of aggregate savings
held by the rich φt as follows:
φt =
ΓR (Nt, φt−1; τ)
µ (Nt, φt−1; τ)
≡ λ (Nt, φt−1; τ) . (28)
From (28), λ (Nt, φt−1; τ) satisfies (a) λN (Nt, φt−1; τ) > 0 for φt−1 > ϕ and λN (Nt, φt−1; τ) <
0 for φt−1 < ϕ, (b) λφ (Nt, φt−1; τ) > 0, and (c) λτ (Nt, φt−1; τ) < 0 for φt−1 > ϕ and
λτ (Nt, φt−1; τ) > 0 for φt−1 < ϕ. See Appendix C for details. Property (a) indicates
that in the region where the relationship φt−1 > ϕ holds, an increase in the number
of specialized intermediate goods Nt increases the share of aggregate savings held
by the rich and thereby it increases the level of inequality. An increase in the num-
ber of specialized intermediate goods Nt increases the wage rate, which motivates
the both poor and rich individuals to save more. However, since αR > αP, the rich
save more than the poor do and leave more wealth to their offspring. Therefore,
an increase in the number of specialized intermediate goods Nt contributes to an
increase in the level of inequality in period t. Property (b) indicates that greater
inequality φt−1 in period t − 1 leads to an increase in inequality in period t. In our
model, greater inequality φt−1 in period t − 1 increases the equilibrium number of
specialized intermediate goods Nt and the wage rate in period t, which motivates
both poor and rich individuals to save more. However, since αR > αP, the rich
save more than the poor do and leave more wealth to their offspring. Therefore,
the inequality φt−1 in period t−1 contributes to an increase in the level of inequal-
ity in period t. Property (c) indicates that in the region where the relationship
φt−1 > ϕ holds, the redistributive policy increases the savings of the poor, whereas
it decreases the savings of the rich and thereby decreases the level of inequality.
The above two difference equations (27) and (28) together with the initial val-
ues N0 and φ−1 characterize the dynamics of the economy. Note that both Nt and
φt−1 in period t are predetermined variables.
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3.2 Phase diagram
The characterization of the global dynamics of the economy requires the depiction
of the phase diagram of the dynamic system defined by (27) and (28). We begin
with the derivation of the Nt+1 = Nt locus on the (Nt, φt−1) plane. Let NN be the
geometric place of all pairs (Nt, φt−1) such that the variety Nt is at steady-state:







if and only if φt−1

> Γ (Nt; τ) ,
= Γ (Nt; τ) ,
< Γ (Nt; τ) ,
(30)







(αR−αP) , ξ(Nt) ≡
Nt
f (Nt)
, ξN(Nt) > 0,
ξNN(Nt) < 0, limNt→0 ξ(Nt) = 0, limNt→∞ ξ(Nt) = ∞. The properties of the NN
locus, as depicted in Figure 2, are:















Thus, as depicted in Figure 2, the NN locus is monotonically increasing and a
strictly concave curve with a positive horizontal intercept N̂. Moreover, since
∆Nt > 0 for φt−1 > Γ (Nt; τ), for a given pair (Nt, φt−1) along NN locus, an in-
crease in φt−1 holding Nt constant, causes φt−1 > Γ (Nt; τ), and therefore ∆Nt > 0.
Similarly, a decrease in φt−1 holding Nt constant, causes φt−1 < Γ (Nt; τ), and
therefore ∆Nt < 0. In addition, as shown in Appendix D, we can see that the
relationships Γτ (Nt; τ) > 0 for φt−1 > ϕ and Γτ (Nt; τ) < 0 for φt−1 < ϕ hold.
Therefore, as depicted in Figure 3, when the government introduces redistribu-
tive policy and increases the tax on bequests τ, the NN locus shifts upward when
φt−1 > ϕ, whereas it shifts downward when φt−1 < ϕ.
Next, we derive the φt = φt−1 locus on the (Nt, φt−1) plane. Let φφ be the
geometric place of all pairs (Nt, φt−1) such that the share of aggregate savings held
by the rich φt is at steady-state:








if and only if φt−1

< Q (Nt; τ)
= Q (Nt; τ)
> Q (Nt; τ)
(32)
where Q (Nt; τ) ≡ {φt−1 | φt−1 = λ (Nt, φt−1; τ)}. The properties of φφ locus, as
depicted in Figure 2, are:
• (0, φL) ∈ φφ for some φL > ϕ,
• (∞, φH) ∈ φφ for some φH < 1,
• dφt−1dNt |φφ=
λN (Nt ,φt−1;τ)
1−λφ(Nt ,φt−1;τ) > 0.
From (28), since λφ (Nt, φt−1; τ) > 0, λφφ (Nt, φt−1; τ) < 0 and 0 < λ (Nt, 0; τ) <
λ (Nt, 1; τ) < 1, evaluating the value of λφ (Nt, φt−1; τ) at the φφ locus, we can see
that the relationship λφ (Nt, φt−1; τ) ∈ (0, 1) holds. Thus, as depicted in Figure
2, the φφ locus is a monotonically increasing and strictly concave curve with a
positive vertical intercept φL and a positive upper bound φH. Moreover, since
∆φt−1 < 0 for φt−1 > Q (Nt; τ), for a given pair (Nt, φt−1) along φφ locus, an
increase in φt−1 holding Nt constant, causes φt−1 > Q (Nt; τ), and therefore ∆φt−1 <
0. Similarly, a decrease in φt−1 holding Nt constant, causes φt−1 < Q (Nt; τ), and
therefore ∆φt−1 > 0. In addition, as shown in Appendix E, we can see that the
relationship Qτ (Nt; τ) < 0 for φt−1 > ϕ holds. Therefore, as depicted in Figure
3, when the government introduces redistributive policy and increases the tax on
bequests τ, the φφ locus shifts downward when φt−1 > ϕ.
3.3 Steady-state equilibrium
Now, we investigate the steady-state of the economy wherein both Nt and φt−1
are constant. Let (N∗, φ∗) be the steady-state equilibrium of the dynamic system
defined by (27) and (28). As depicted in Figure 2, there exists a unique steady-
state equilibrium E (N∗, φ∗) that is determined by the intersections of the NN locus
and the φφ locus on the (Nt, φt−1) plane. The steady-state measure of inequality
φ∗ lies above the rich population ratio ϕ (i.e., φ∗ > ϕ). As Nt and φt−1 in period t
are predetermined variables, their initial values, N0 and φ−1, are historically given.
Therefore, as inferred from Figure 2, all economies, irrespective of their initial
endowments of (N0, φ−1), eventually approach this steady-state equilibrium E(N∗,
φ∗). More precisely, linearizing (27) and (28) around the steady-state equilibrium
E(N∗, φ∗), we obtain Nt+1 − N∗
φt − φ∗














µ∗N ≡ µN (N∗, φ∗; τ) ∈ (0, 1), µ∗φ ≡ µφ (N∗, φ∗; τ) > 0, λ∗N ≡ λN (N∗, φ∗; τ) > 0 and
λ∗φ ≡ λφ (N∗, φ∗; τ) ∈ (0, 1). Here, let J be the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the
steady-state equilibrium E (N∗, φ∗).
From investigations of (33) and (34), we can obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 1 The eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix J, ω1 and ω2, are real
and have a modulus of less than one (i.e., ω1, ω2 ∈ (−1, 1)). The steady-state
equilibrium E (N∗, φ∗) of the dynamic system defined by (27) and (28) is a sink.
Proof of Proposition 1 is given in Appendix F. Suppose that both eigenvalues, ω1
and ω2, are positive (i.e., ω1, ω2 ∈ (0, 1)), the orbits in the neighborhood of E (N∗,
φ∗) are monotone, and we have stable nodes. However, suppose that the eigen-
values have opposite signs (i.e., −1 < ω1 < 0 < ω2 < 1) and the orbits in the
neighborhood of E (N∗, φ∗) are oscillatory, which corresponds to stable spirals. In
either case, all economies, irrespective of their initial endowments of (N0, φ−1),
eventually approach to the steady-state equilibrium E(N∗, φ∗). Moreover, con-
cerning comparative statics in the steady-state equilibrium E(N∗, φ∗), we obtain
the following proposition:
Proposition 2 The relationships dN∗dτ < 0 and
dφ∗
dτ < 0 hold.
Proof for this proposition is shown in Appendix G. As depicted in Figure 3, the
introduction of redistributive policy and an increase in the tax on bequests τ neg-
atively affects the share of aggregate savings held by the rich as well as the ag-
gregate savings of the economy, and thereby decreases the steady-state level of
inequality as well as the number of product varieties (i.e., φ∗ > φ′ and N∗ > N′).
In the steady-state equilibrium where the relationships Nt = Nt−1 = N∗ and
φt = φt−1 = φ
∗ hold, from (23) and (24), the per capita output growth rate becomes
equivalent to the product quality growth rate as follows:
Gy∗ ≡ Gyt |Nt=N∗= GZ∗ ≡ GZ(N∗). (35)
From (24), since the quality growth rate GZt in period t is negatively related to the
amount of product variety Nt+1 in period t + 1, as depicted in Figure 1, the decline
in the level of product variety due to an increase in the tax on bequests τ leads to
the higher steady-state growth rate of product quality (i.e., GZ (N∗) < GZ (N′)).
Intuitively, the introduction of redistributive policy and an increase in the tax on
bequests τ discourages the entry of new firms, which in turn expands each firm’s
market size and increases incentives for process innovation. Summarizing these
results, we obtain the following proposition:
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Proposition 3 The relationships dGZ∗dτ > 0 and
dGy∗
dτ > 0 hold.
The introduction of redistributive policy and an increase in the tax on bequests τ
increases the steady-state growth rate of product quality and per capita output by
reducing the steady-state number of firms.
In summary, concerning the long-run (i.e., steady-state) effects of redistribu-
tive policy on per capita output growth and inequality, we obtain the following
results.
Result 1 The introduction of redistributive policy decreases the steady-state level
of inequality, reduces the entry of new firms, and expands the market size of each
firm. The larger market size increases incentives for process innovation and in-
creases the steady-state growth rate of product quality and per capita output.
3.4 Welfare
In this subsection, we solve for the welfare levels of both the rich and poor indi-
viduals in generation t. Using equations (1) to (5), (9), (14), (16) to (18), (21),




, the lifetime utility level of individuals i ∈ {R, P} born in period
t (i.e., generation t) is given by




i (1 + rt+1)
αi(wt + bit + Tt)
]
, (36)































wt = (1 − θ)
Yt
L
= (1 − θ)θ 2θ1−θZtNσt ,
1 + rt+1 =
















Here, in order to clarify the explanation of the following numerical simulation
analyses, we introduce the time index of the tax rate on bequests τt explicitly.
From the above expressions, we can summarize the effects of redistributive policy
on the lifetime utility of individuals in generation t as follows.
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Let us first explain the direct effects of redistributive policy on welfare. Given
the value of wt and rt+1, the introduction of redistributive policy and an increase
in the tax on bequests affects the lifetime utility of individuals in generation t




< 0, an increase
in the tax on bequests τt+1 in period t + 1 negatively affects the lifetime utility of
both poor and rich individuals in generation t through its distortionary effects on








> 0, an increase
in the tax on bequests τt in period t and the resulting income transfer from the
rich to the poor negatively affects the lifetime utility of the rich individuals in
generation t, whereas it positively affects the lifetime utility of the poor individuals
in generation t.
Let us next explain the indirect effects of redistributive policy on welfare. The
redistributive policy also indirectly affects the lifetime utility of individuals in
generation t through its negative impacts on the level of product variety Nt and
the level of inequality φt and its positive impacts on the level of product quality
Zt. The lower level of product variety Nt negatively affects the lifetime utility of
individuals in generation t through declines in the wage rate wt, bequests from
their parents bit, and lump-sum transfers from the government Tt, whereas it posi-
tively affects the lifetime utility of individuals in generation t through an increase
in the interest rate rt. The lower level of inequality φt−1 negatively affects the
lifetime utility of rich individuals in generation t through a decline in bequests
from their parents bRt . In contrast, it positively affects the lifetime utility of poor
individuals in generation t through an increase in bequests from their parents bPt .
The higher level of product quality Zt positively affects the lifetime utility of indi-
viduals in generation t through increases in the wage rate wt, bequests from their
parents bit and lump-sum transfers from the government Tt. The higher product
quality growth rate GZt also positively affects the lifetime utility of individuals in
generation t through an increase in the interest rate rt.
Unfortunately, even focusing on the steady-state equilibrium, it is difficult for
us to analytically clarify the welfare implications of redistributive policy. There-
fore, to obtain further insights, we resort to numerical simulation analysis in the
following section.
4 Numerical Analysis
In this section, to obtain further insights with respect to the effects of redistributive
policy on the per capita output growth rate, inequality, and welfare in the transition
process, we resort to the numerical simulations of our model. We consider the
case where the economy is initially in the steady-state equilibrium where the tax
rate on bequests τ is given by zero (i.e., τk = 0 for all period k < 3). Then, our
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steady-state economy introduces the redistributive policy from period 3. More
concretely, in our benchmark analysis, the tax rate on bequests in period 3 and
subsequent periods is increased from 0 to 0.2 (i.e., τk = 0.2 for all periods k ≥ 3).
As inferred from (23), in the transition process, the per capita output growth
rate is determined not only by the quality growth rate but also the variety growth
rate. Therefore, in contrast to the steady-state equilibrium analyzed in the previous
section, the effects of redistribution policy on variety growth play a significant
role in determining the overall effects of redistribution policy on per capita output
growth. The main objective of the following numerical exercises is not to calibrate
our simple model to actual data but to supplement the qualitative results of our
theoretical model. Therefore, although we chose the parameter values carefully,
the quantitative results obtained in our paper should be interpreted with caution.
4.1 The Model Parameterization
The model features the following set of parameters {ϕ, β, αR, αP, γ, σ, δ, k}. Table
1 lists our preset parameters, the values of which reflect available empirical esti-
mates or existing numerical studies. We follow Maebayashi and Konishi (2021)
to set the population share of the rich ϕ to 0.5, the relative importance parameter
of consumption when old and leaving a bequest β to 0.3, the intertemporal prefer-
ence parameter of the rich αR to 0.45, and the poor αP to 0.25. Then, we set the
degree of technology spillover 1 − γ to 0.833, which corresponds to the baseline
simulation parameter value of Iacopetta et al. (2019).
The value of σ represents the social return to variety. The closest empiri-
cal counterpart to our σ is the “elasticity of productivity to variety” calculated
by Broda et al. (2006), ranging from 0.05 to 0.2. However, as stressed by
Brunnschweiler et al. (2017), the empirical estimates of “gains from variety”
that come from empirical studies on international trade are not fully consistent
with the notion of “gains from differentiation” originally emphasized by Romer
(1990). Therefore, we adopt a conservative approach by setting the baseline value
of σ on the high end, σ = 0.2, and then perform a sensitivity analysis with wide
values of σ.
Given these preset parameters, we calibrate the two remaining parameters
listed in Panel B of Table 2, the inefficiency parameter of variety R&D (δ) and
the efficiency parameter of in-house R&D (k), to match the 2 target values of the
endogenous variables listed in Panel A of Table 2. The target value of the mass
of firms relative to population, N
∗
L = 0.0327, equals the OECD-average numbers
of firms in 2013, N∗ = 1, 181, 040, divided by the average population in the same
year, L = 365, 525, 680. 4 Since the target value of this variable is already calcu-
4According to the United Nations (2015), the target population (i.e., L = 365, 525, 680)
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lated by Brunnschweiler et al. (2017: Table 1, p39), we employ their calculated
value as our target value. The target value of the per capita output growth rate,
Gy∗ = 1.02, approximates the average per capita GDP growth rate of developed
countries over a century (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004: Table I.1, p13). We iden-




we adjust the value of δ to match the target value of N
∗
L , whereas the value of k is
adjusted to match the target value of Gy∗. These procedures yield the calibrated
values of (δ, k) reported in Panel B of Table 2. 5
4.2 The effects of the redistributive policy
Figures 4-a to 4-f show the numerical examples of the transition path of the tax
rate on bequests τt (Figure 4-a), the share of aggregate savings held by the rich
φt (Figure 4-b), the number of firms per capita Nt/L (Figure 4-c), the product
variety growth rate GNt (Figure 4-d), the product quality growth rate G
Z
t (Figure
4-e), and the per capita output growth rate Gyt (Figure 4-f) under the benchmark
parameter value of the social return to variety parameter σ (i.e., σ = 0.2). Then,
we compare four different values of tax rate on bequests (i.e., τ = 0, 0.1, 0.2 and
0.3). Moreover, Figure 4-g and Figure 4-h show the net welfare gain of rich and
poor individuals who belong to generations 1-9 (i.e., those born between periods
1-9), which describes how the lifetime utility levels of rich and poor individuals
are affected by the redistributive policy implemented in period 3. The τ = 0.1 line
shows the difference in the level of lifetime utility between τ = 0.1 and τ = 0;
the τ = 0.2 line, τ = 0.3 line shows the differences between τ = 0.2, 0.3 and 0,
respectively.
The introduction of the redistributive policy in period 3 (Figure 4-a) decreases
the share of savings held by the rich φt and thereby decreases the level of inequal-
ity in period 3 and onwards (Figure 4-b). As a result, the level of inequality φt
gradually converges to its new steady-state value, which is smaller than that in the
original steady-state equilibrium. The introduction of the redistributive policy in
period 3 also decreases the number of firms per capita in period 4 and onwards
(Figure 4-c). Therefore, since GN3 = N4/N3, variety growth rate G
N
t suddenly drops
matches the average population of OECD countries in 2013. Moreover, by summing the data
reported in the OECD (2016: Ch2, Table 2.1) across countries, the aggregate number of enter-
prises in 2013 in OECD economies is 46,060,568 (all sizes and sectors). Dividing this number
by 39 countries, we obtain the OECD-average numbers of firms in 2013, N∗ = 1, 181, 040. See
Appendix E of Brunnschweiler et al. (2017) for further details.
5The initial values of both the average quality of products Z0 and the number of firms N0 are
normalized to 1 and the initial saving share of the rich φ−1 is given by 0.55. Since the starting point
of our numerical simulation exercise is the steady-state equilibrium where the tax on bequests
τ is given by zero, our numerical simulation results do not change even when we consider the
alternative values of Z0, N0 and φ−1.
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in period 3, and it gradually returns to its steady-state value of 1 (Figure 4-d), as
the number of firms per capita gradually approaches to its new steady-state value
which is smaller than that in the original steady-state equilibrium.
As inferred from (24), the quality growth rate GZt in period t is negatively re-
lated to the number of intermediate-good firms Nt+1 in period t + 1. Therefore,
since the introduction of the redistributive policy in period 3 decreases the num-
ber of firms per capita in period 4 and onwards (Figure 4-c), the product quality
growth rate GZt begins to increase from period 3, and gradually converges to its
new steady-state value, which is higher than that in the original steady-state equi-
librium (Figure 4-e).
Equation (23) indicates that the per capita output growth rate Gyt in Figure
4-f depends on the variety growth rate GNt in Figure 4-d and the product quality
growth rate GZt in Figure 4-e. Moreover, the degree of social return to variety
parameter σ determines the relative importance of the variety growth rate GNt
on the per capita output growth rate Gyt . Figures 4-d to 4-f show the transition




t when the degree of the social return to variety parameter
σ is 0.2, which is the high end of the empirical estimates of σ by Broda et al.
(2006). Thus, the evolutions of GNt in Figure 4-d and G
Z
t in Figure 4-e indicate that
the introduction of the redistributive policy in period 3 provides two competing
impacts upon the per capita output growth rate in period 3 (Figure 4-f). On the one
hand, as shown in Figure 4-d, the decline in the growth rate of the product variety
in period 3 negatively affects the per capita output growth rate in period 3. On
the other hand, as shown in Figure 4-e, the rise in the growth rate of the product
quality in period 3 positively affects the per capita output growth rate in period
3. In our benchmark simulation (i.e., σ = 0.2), since the latter positive effect
dominates the former negative effect, the per capita output growth rate in period 3
becomes higher than that in the original steady-state equilibrium. Consequently,
the per capita output growth rate under the redistributive policy is always beyond
that in the original steady-state.
After period 3, the economy gradually converges to its new steady-state equi-
librium. During this transition process, the product variety growth rate gradu-
ally approaches 1. Therefore, in the steady-state equilibrium, the per capita out-
put growth rate becomes equivalent to the quality growth rate. Consequently, as
shown in Figures 4-e and 4-f, the new steady-state equilibrium’s per capita output
growth rate becomes higher than in the original steady-state equilibrium. There-
fore, as stated in Proposition 3, the long-run effect of the redistributive policy on
per capita output growth is positive.
Figures 4-g and 4-h show the net welfare gain of rich and poor individuals
who belong to generations 1-9 (i.e., those born between periods 1-9) when the
redistributive policy is implemented in period 3. However, in period 3 (i.e., gener-
ation 2), the old individuals only pay bequest taxes in their old period and cannot
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receive any government transfer in their young period. Therefore, their value of
welfare gain is negative, and the redistributive policy implemented in period 3
lowers the welfare level of both rich and poor individuals in generation 2. How-
ever, since young poor individuals in period 3 (i.e., generation 3) receive a net
income transfer at the expense of young and old rich individuals, the introduction
of the redistributive policy in period 3 raises the welfare level of poor individu-
als in generation 3 (Figure 4-h). In contrast, it lowers the welfare level of rich
individuals in generation 3 (Figure 4-g).
As shown in Figure 4-c, the redistributive policy implemented in period 3 de-
creases the number of firms per capita in period 4 and onwards, which negatively
affects the lifetime utility level of individuals in generation t ≥ 4 through declines
in the wage rate, bequests from their parents, and lump-sum transfers from the
government. However, as shown in Figure 4-e, the redistributive policy imple-
mented in period 3 also increases the growth rate of the product quality in period
3 and onwards, which positively affects the lifetime utility level of individuals in
generation t ≥ 4 through increases in the wage rate, the interest rate, bequests
from their parents, and lump-sum transfers from the government. As the number
of firms per capita gradually converges to its new steady-state value, the latter pos-
itive welfare effect is more likely to dominate the former negative welfare effect
because the latter growth-enhancing effect lasts permanently. Consequently, as
shown in Figures 4-g and 4-h, the welfare losses of rich individuals in generation
t ≥ 4 become smaller over time, whereas the welfare gains of rich individuals in
generation t ≥ 4 becomes larger over time. When τ = 0.2, the net welfare gain
of rich individuals in generation t ≥ 12 turns out to be positive. These numerical
simulation results indicate that an intergenerational conflict between current and
future generations exists concerning the implementation of redistributive policy.
As in the pension reform literature (e.g., Breyer and Straub, 1993; Wigger 2001),
a well-designed debt financing scheme might be necessary for pursuing a Pareto
improving redistributive policy. This issue is beyond the scope of this paper and
is left for future research.
4.3 Sensitivity analyses
In our benchmark simulation (i.e., σ = 0.2), as shown in Figure 4-f, the redis-
tributive policy positively affects the per capita output growth rate in the long run
and the short run. However, this result heavily depends on the value of the social
return to variety parameter σ used in our benchmark simulation. The empirical es-
timates of σ by Broda et al. (2006) range from 0.05 to 0.2. Hence, our benchmark
parameter value of σ follows the high end of their empirical estimates. Never-
theless, it is difficult to obtain a reliable estimate value of σ. Moreover, the main
objective of our numerical exercises is not to calibrate our simple model to actual
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data but to supplement the qualitative results of our theoretical model. Therefore,
to clarify the growth implications of redistributive policy, this subsection performs
a sensitivity analysis with wide values of σ in the range of 0.2-0.8.
Figures 5-a to 5-d show the numerical examples of the transition path of the
tax rate on bequests τt (Figure 5-a), the product variety growth rate GNt (Figure
5-b), the product quality growth rate GZt (Figure 5-c), and the per capita output
growth rate Gyt (Figure 5-d) under different values of the social return to variety
parameter σ (i.e., σ = 0.2, 0.4, 0.6 and 0.8), when the tax rate on bequests in
period 3 and subsequent periods is increased from 0 to 0.2 (i.e., τk = 0.2 for
all periods k ≥ 3). From (23), the redistributive policy implemented in period 3
generates two competing impacts on the per capita output growth rate in period 3
(Figure 5-d). On the one hand, as shown in Figure 5-b, the decline in the growth
rate of the product variety in period 3 negatively affects the per capita output
growth rate in period 3. On the other hand, as shown in Figure 5-c, the rise
in the growth rate of the product quality in period 3 positively affects the per
capita output growth rate in period 3. In our simulation, when the degree of social
return to variety parameter σ is sufficiently small, as described in the σ = 0.2 and
σ = 0.4 lines in Figure 5-d, since the latter positive effect dominates the former
negative effect, the per capita output growth rate in period 3 becomes higher than
that in the original steady-state equilibrium. However, when the degree of social
return to variety parameter σ is sufficiently large, as described in the σ = 0.6
and σ = 0.8 lines in Figure 5-d, the per capita output growth rate in period 3
becomes lower than that in the original steady-state equilibrium since the former
negative effect dominates the latter positive effect. After period 3, since both the
growth rate of product variety and product quality rises gradually, the per capita
output growth rate also increases gradually. As shown in Figures 5-c and 5-d, the
new steady-state equilibrium’s per capita output growth rate becomes higher than
in the original steady-state equilibrium. Therefore, irrespective of the values of
σ, the long-run effect of the redistributive policy on per capita output growth is
positive.
These results imply that the short-run effect of the redistributive policy on
economic growth is generally ambiguous and depends on the values of the social
return to variety parameter σ. Suppose that the degree of social return to variety
parameter σ is sufficiently small; then, the per capita output growth rate under the
redistributive policy is always beyond that in the original steady-state. Therefore,
the redistributive policy positively affects the per capita output growth rate in the
long run and the short run. However, suppose that the degree of social return
to variety parameter σ is sufficiently large; the length of periods, for which the
per capita output growth rate under the redistributive policy is below that in the
original steady-state, is relatively long. Therefore, the short-run effect of the re-
distributive policy on economic growth is negative. Although empirical estimates
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of σ by Broda et al. (2006) support a sufficiently small value of σ, it is difficult
to obtain a reliable estimate value of σ. Therefore, the short-run effect of the
redistributive policy on economic growth remains inconclusive.
In summary, concerning the short-run effects of redistributive policy on per
capita output growth, we obtain the following results.
Result 2 Suppose that the degree of social return to variety parameter σ is suf-
ficiently small, then the short-run effect of the redistributive policy on economic
growth is positive. However, suppose that the degree of social return to variety pa-
rameter σ is sufficiently large, then the short-run effect of the redistributive policy
on economic growth is negative.
5 Concluding Remarks
Employing a two-period overlapping generations model of R&D-based growth
with both product development and process innovation, we examined how a re-
distributive policy for reducing inequality by taxing the bequests of the rich and
redistributing the revenue to the poor affects the per capita output growth rate of
the economy. We showed that such a policy simultaneously raises growth and re-
duces inequality in the long run. Moreover, when the market structure adjusts, par-
tially in the short- run, the effect of the redistributive policy on economic growth
depends on the values of the social return to variety parameter, while it reduces
inequality. However, when the market structure adjusts fully in the long run, the
redistributive policy discourages the entry of new firms but enhances economic
growth and reduces inequality. These favorable predictions regarding the impact
of the redistributive policy on economic growth and inequality are partly consis-
tent with empirical findings that show that the redistribution is generally benign
in terms of economic growth and the lower post-tax and transfer inequality is
correlated with faster and more durable growth. Thus, the redistributive bequest
taxation is perhaps appropriate to stimulate long-run economic growth and reduce
inequality.
Before concluding this paper, we note several limitations of our paper and dis-
cuss directions for future research. First, we ignore several important elements of
the real economy for clarity of our main arguments, such as the risk of R&D activ-
ities and the presence of imperfect credit and insurance markets. Although these
model simplifications enable us to obtain a clear-cut intuitive prediction regarding
the effect of redistribution policy on R&D-based growth, some of them are overly
restrictive from an empirical perspective. For example, in the presence of imper-
fect credit and insurance markets, redistribution can be growth-enhancing through
an “opportunity cost effect” that allows more individuals to invest in education, as
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in Galor and Zeira (1993), or through an “insurance effect” that provides a certain
degree of insurance to entrepreneurs and stimulates innovations and growth, as
in Garcı́a-Peñelosa (2008). Since our paper ignores the important roles of the re-
distribution policy stressed in the existing literature, the application of our simple
framework for assessing the quantitative impact of policy reform is limited.
Second, for analytical tractability, this paper assumes that the rich save a larger
proportion of their income than the poor and leave more wealth to their offspring.
Although this assumption is empirically supported and improves the tractability
of the model greatly, the micro foundation of this assumption should be modeled
explicitly. As in Galor and Zeira (1993), the presence of imperfect credit markets
and the limited investment opportunities of the poor may generate analogous the-
oretical results. Nevertheless, the micro foundation of this assumption will be a
promising direction for future research.
Third, for analytical tractability, this paper assumes that the product devel-
opment firms that are inventing new varieties have to incur an R&D expenditure
one period in advance of production. In contrast, intermediate goods firms can
improve their production efficiency instantaneously through their in-house pro-
cess innovation. Thus, this asymmetric specification of product development and
process innovation improves the tractability of the model greatly without altering
the main predictions of this paper. Nevertheless, it will be interesting to consider
alternative specifications for R&D activities.
Fourth, since this paper uses a two-period OLG framework, if we employ a
straightforward interpretation, one period in our model is interpreted as approx-
imately 30 years. The concept of “short-run” in our model does not match the
concept of “short-run” in the real world, making comparing our theoretical results
with actual data slightly difficult. Therefore, to evaluate the quantitative impact
of redistribution policy on economic growth and inequality more precisely, it is
necessary to develop a more elaborate numerical version of the large-scale OLG
model with various important elements of the real economy, such as the risk of
R&D activities and the presence of imperfect credit and insurance markets.
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Appendix
Appendix A: The market-clearing condition for assets
Due to perfect competition in the final goods market, the value of the final goods
output is expressed as follows:
Yt = wtL + NtPtXt.
Using (11) and (18), the above equation can be rewritten as follows:
Yt = wtL + [(1 + rt)Vt−1 − Vt] Nt + (Xt + ZtIt) Nt.
Substituting (17) and the above equation into (20), we obtain the following ex-
pression:












(1 − ϕ)L + VtNt+1.
Thus, by substituting (2), (3), and (19) into the above equation, we obtain
VtNt+1 −
[
sRt ϕL + s
P
t (1 − ϕ)L
]









Because initial assets are given by V−1N0 = sR−1ϕL + s
P
−1(1 − ϕ)L, we can obtain
the following asset market equilibrium condition:
VtNt+1 = sRt ϕL + s
P
t (1 − ϕ)L.
Appendix B: The properties of µ (Nt, φt−1; τ) in (27)
By differentiating (27) with respect to Nt, φt−1 and τ, we obtain
µN (Nt, φt−1; τ) = ᾱ fN(Nt) + β
[
θ(1 − γ) fN (Nt) + 1
] α̂ (φt−1) + ᾱτ
1 + τ
> 0,
µφ (Nt, φt−1; τ) = β
[
θ(1 − γ) f (Nt) + Nt
] (αR − αP)
1 + τ
> 0,
µτ (Nt, φt−1; τ) =
β
[
θ(1 − γ) f (Nt) + Nt
]
(αR − αP) (ϕ − φt−1)
(1 + τ)2

< 0, for φt−1 > ϕ,
= 0, for φt−1 = ϕ,
> 0, for φt−1 < ϕ,
where α̂(φt−1) ≡ αRφt−1 + αP(1 − φt−1).
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Appendix C: The properties of λ (Nt, φt−1; τ) in (28)
The derivation of (28)









Using (5), (6), (9), (14), (17), (18), (19), (21), (22), and the definition of φt, the








ΓR (Nt, φt−1; τ)
Nt
. (A.2)









Thus, by substituting (17), (A.2), and VtNt+1 = At into (A.3), we obtain (28).
The properties of (28)
By differentiating (28) with respect to Nt, φt−1 and τ, we obtain
λN (Nt, φt−1; τ) =
αRαPβ(φt−1−ϕ)
1+τ (1 − σ) f (Nt)
µ (Nt, φt−1; τ)2

> 0, for φt−1 > ϕ,
= 0, for φt−1 = ϕ,
< 0, for φt−1 < ϕ,




θ(1 − γ) f (Nt) + Nt
] {
f (Nt) + β
[
θ(1 − γ) f (Nt) + Nt
]}
µ (Nt, φt−1; τ)2
> 0,




θ(1 − γ) f (Nt) + Nt
] {
f (Nt) + β
[
θ(1 − γ) f (Nt) + Nt
]}
(ϕ − φt−1)
µ (Nt, φt−1; τ)2

< 0, for φt−1 > ϕ,
= 0, for φt−1 = ϕ,
> 0, for φt−1 < ϕ.
Appendix D: The effect of an increase in τ on the NN locus
From (27), since µN (Nt, φt−1; τ) > 0, µNN (Nt, φt−1; τ) < 0, µ (0, φt−1; τ) = 0 and limNt→∞ µ (Nt, φt−1; τ) =
∞, evaluating the value of µN (Nt, φt−1; τ) at the NN locus, we can see that the relationship
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µN (Nt, φt−1; τ) ∈ (0, 1) holds. Thus, by totally differentiating (29) with respect to Nt and




µτ (Nt, φt−1; τ)
1 − µN (Nt, φt−1; τ)
,

< 0, for φt−1 > ϕ,
= 0, for φt−1 = ϕ,
> 0, for φt−1 < ϕ.
These results indicate that an increase in τ holding φt−1 constant, decreases (resp., in-
creases) the value of Nt that satisfies ∆Nt = µ (Nt, φt−1; τ) − Nt = 0 when φt−1 > ϕ (resp.,
φt−1 < ϕ). Therefore, we obtain the following results:
Γτ (Nt; τ)

> 0, for φt−1 > ϕ,
= 0, for φt−1 = ϕ,
< 0, for φt−1 < ϕ.
Appendix E: The effect of an increase in τ on φφ locus
From (28), since λφ (Nt, φt−1; τ) > 0, λφφ (Nt, φt−1; τ) < 0 and 0 < λ (Nt, 0; τ) < λ (Nt, 1; τ) <
1, evaluating the value of λφ (Nt, φt−1; τ) at the φφ locus, we can see that the relationship
λφ (Nt, φt−1; τ) ∈ (0, 1) holds. Thus, by totally differentiating (31) with respect to φt−1 and




λτ (Nt, φt−1; τ)
1 − λφ (Nt, φt−1; τ)
,

< 0, for φt−1 > ϕ,
= 0, for φt−1 = ϕ,
> 0, for φt−1 < ϕ.
These results indicate that an increase in τ holding Nt constant, decreases (resp., increases)
the value of φt−1 that satisfies ∆φt−1 = λ (Nt, φt−1; τ) − φt−1 = 0 for φt−1 > ϕ (resp.,
φt−1 < ϕ). Therefore, we obtain the following results:
Qτ (Nt, φt−1; τ)

< 0, for φt−1 > ϕ,
= 0, for φt−1 = ϕ,
> 0, for φt−1 < ϕ.
In equilibrium, since the relationship φt−1 > ϕ holds for all t, we can confirm that the
relationship Qτ (Nt, φt−1; τ) < 0 holds.
Appendix F: Proof of Proposition 1
The characteristic equation of the Jacobian matrix J is given by
Φ(ω) ≡ ω2 − tr (J)ω + |J| = 0, (A.4)
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where tr (J) and |J| denote the trace and determinant of matrix J. The eigenvalues of the
matrix J, ω1 and ω2, are given by the solution to this quadratic equation. Calculating
tr (J) and |J|, we obtain
tr (J) = µ∗N + λ
∗
φ ∈ (0, 2),
|J| = µ∗Nλ∗φ − µ∗φλ∗N .
In addition, the discriminant of the characteristic equation ∆ is given by







Hence, the eigenvalues are necessarily real.
The steady-state E (N∗, φ∗) is a sink, if both eigenvalues of the matrix J, ω1 and ω2,
have modulus less than 1 (i.e., ω1, ω2 ∈ (−1, 1)). From (34), suppose that
Φ(1) = 1 − tr (J) + |J| = (1 − ω1)(1 − ω2) > 0, (A.5)
then both eigenvalues, ω1 and ω2, must fall on the same side of 1. Since tr (J) = ω1+ω2 ∈
(0, 2), this result means that if Φ(1) > 0, both eigenvalues, ω1 and ω2, must lie in (−1, 1)
(i.e., ω1, ω2 ∈ (−1, 1)). Therefore, Φ(1) > 0 ensures that the steady-state E (N∗, φ∗) is a
sink.
From (29) and (31), the slope of the NN locus evaluated at steady-state E (N∗, φ∗) is
given by dφt−1dNt |NN=
1−µ∗N
µ∗φ
, whereas the slope of the φφ locus is given by dφt−1dNt |φφ=
λ∗N
1−λ∗φ .
As depicted in Figure 3, the slope of the NN locus is steeper than that of the φφ locus.







This equation can be rewritten as follows:
1 − tr (J) + |J| > 0.
Hence, from (A.5), Φ(1) > 0 holds and the steady-state E (N∗, φ∗) is a sink.
Appendix G: Proof of Proposition 2










λ∗τ(1 − µ∗N) + µ∗τλ∗N
Φ(1)
< 0,
where µ∗τ ≡ µτ (N∗, φ∗; τ) < 0, λ∗τ ≡ λτ (N∗, φ∗; τ) < 0 and Φ(1) = 1 − tr (J) + |J| =
1 − (µ∗N + λ∗φ) + µ∗Nλ∗φ − λ∗Nµ∗φ > 0.
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Table 1: Preset parameters
Parameter Description Value
ϕ Population ratio of rich 0.5
β Relative importance of consumption/bequest 0.3
αR Intertemporal preference parameter of rich 0.45
αP Intertemporal preference parameter of poor 0.25
1 − γ Degree of technology spillovers 0.833
σ Social return to variety 0.2 (0.2-0.8)
Table 2: Calibration of baseline parameters and steady-state results




Target values 0.0327 1.02
Baseline simulation results 0.0327 1.02
B. Calibrated Parameters δ k
Baseline simulation Parameters 31.722 0.263015




















φφ locus: Q (Nt; τ)












φt = φt−1 locus






Figure 3: The effect of Changes in tax rate τ
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Figure 4: Changes in tax rate τ from 0 to 0.1, 0.2 and 0.3 under σ=0.2
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Figure 5: Changes in tax rate τ from 0 to 0.2 under σ=0.2, 0.4, 0.6 and 0.8
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